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Abstract: We study the notions of partial conservativity and interpre-
tability over fragments of Peano arithmetic. 
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Introduction. Let S,T be theories, S«T, and let P be a class of formu-
las of T. S is P -conservative over T if for each y 6 P , provability of y 
in S implies provability of y in T. In particular, if y is a T formula then 
y is said to be P-conservative over T if the theory (T+g?) is T-conserva-
tive over T,"Partial conservativity" means " P -conservativity for some P". 
The first nontrivial example of partial conservativity was exhibited by Krei-
sel [62] ; the first systematic paper on partial conservativity is Guaspari 
[76] (containing also results by Solovay). Then various people contributed, 
among them Lindstrbm, Smorynski and the present author (see references). A 
recent work is Bennet [86]. These papers typically discuss partial conservati-
vity over theories in the language of arithmetic containing PA (Peano arithme 
tic); but equally typically, contain a remark saying that the assumptions on 
the underlying theory are in fact too strong and a weaker theory would suffi-
ce. One of the advantages of former theories is that for such a theory T, in-
terpretability of (T+y) in T is equivalent to TT -conservativity of (T+jp) 
over T and thus results on interpretability can be^obtained as corollaries. 
Here we work systematically with theories containing I X , (i.e. arithmetic 
with induction restricted to 2,-formulas) but having possibly a richer lan-
guage. One basic difference of fragments I-E n from the whole PA is that they 
are finitely axiomatizable. As we shall see, this does not affect much proper 
ties of partial conservativity but does affect properties of interpretabili-
ty. For positive results on interpretability we shall heavily use a result 
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due to Pudl4k (formulated below) and its strengthening. A second obstacle is 
the fact that over a weak theory like l £ p J n formulas are not closed un-
der bounded universal quantification: but it turns out that this can be eas-
ily overcome. The result of our investigation is a systematic treatment of 
partial conservativity over theories containing I S , and of its relation to 
interpretability. We shall give only very sketchy hints on proofs? full 
proofs are contained in a Czech typescript not for publication$ the proofs 
will also be incorporated in a forthcoming book. The paper is organized as 
follows; § 1 contains preliminaries, § 2 discusses prominent examples (Gddel's 
and Rosser's formulas), § 3 presents general theorems on partial conservativi 
ty, § 4 contains applications to interpretability and § 5 elaborates a clas-
sification of independent .SLj sentences. 
S 1. Prelininaries, We say ^interpretation" meaning "relative interpre-
tation with absolute equality1* (cf. Tarski, Mostowski, Robinson C53]), First 
recall the old result on interpretability for PA and similar theories, 
1.1. Trworea (Qrey» Hajek, Guaspari). Let S, T be axiomatized theories 
in the language of PA and let S5fcT.£PA. Then the following are equivalenti 
(i) S is interpretable in T, 
(ii) S is T?,.-conservative over T, 
(iii) for each k, T i~ Corw^, 
(iv) there is a binumeratioo {I of S in T such that T r- Con^ , 
(Similarly for S3T2ZF in the language of IF and in general for S,?T where 
T contains PA and proves induction for all T-formulas.) 
See Orey t6B, Ha>k U2X Guaspari 063. 
The following lemma is easy but basic for our considerations. 
1.2. Lowe. Let fix} be a 5 ^-formula (whose free variables are x and 
possibly others. There is a X -formula y(y) such that 
(1) (Vk) IX X r-if(k)3»(Vx4k)$(x), 
(2) IZX r~ Y W - * <Vx-*y)»(x), 
Proof. Trivial for h*0. For n£l and $ ( x ) « ts!. u)«j(x,u) let y(y) be 
(3 s)(Seq(s)8k(Vx iy)«c(x,(s)x). 
1.3. Notation. The formula y(y) from the previous lemma will be denot« 
ed [(V x.6y)9(x)}#»2»n or simply £(¥ xAy)$W)* , Dually, for each TT^-
formula <p(x) we have a TT-formula y(y) (denoted by [(3 x4y) <jp(xX1*» ,ny* 
such that 
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(VkHJEjf Y(k)» (3x£k)y(x), 
iaEji- (ixiy)^(x) -*if(y). 
1.4. Discussion and definition (proofs from true formulas; herbrandian 
proofs). It is well known that in I2L *e may define partial truth predica-
tes: for each n we have a 2t truth definition for all 3En senterices satis-
fying the usual Tarski s conditions and similarly for TT instead of JET . If 
P is "£. or TTn then Trp(x) means the corresponding truth predicate; 
IS-^t- J -5 Tr (oj ) for each a; e P . He make the following definition (y is 
a proof of x from a true P-formula): 
Prfr(x,y)ai (3z*y)(z 6 P S a r r ( z ) . m P r f ( * - - » x,y». 
Clearly, if V is 2En then Prfr is 2En in I2E,: a trivial transformation 
shows that if P is TTn then Prfr is TTn in I2E,. Here Prf is the proof pre-
dicate for a given theory defined in "Hilbert style1*. He shall also use the 
"Herbrand style" proof predicate HPrf investigated by Pudlai* 1853, but only 
for finitely axiomatized theories T. In words, a herbrandian proof of §> in T 
is a prepositional proof of a disjunction of instances of the quantifier-free 
part of B e ( A T — * o> ), where, for any y , He(*f) is the purely existential 
Herbrand form of f • 
Similarly we define HPrf^ for P being X n or TT . 
Pr(x) and BPr(x) are provability predicates (usual and hertHraralian); 
clearly, IX, r- (V x)(Pr(x)si HPr(x)). But this equivalence does not relati-
vize to definable cuts - see next definition. 
1.5. Definition. (1) Let T3Q (Q is Robinson's arithmetic). A formula 
J(x) with one free variable defines a cut in T if T proves the following: 
3(0)%(tf x)Q(x) -# 3(x+l)8t(Vx,y)(y<xS.3(x) -a. 3(y». 
Note that if <T is PA then T I- (v*x)3(x) for each such 3; but this is not toe 
case for any fragment I X - there are cuts 3 such toat (Vx)3(i0 is unprov-
able. 
(2) A theory T 2 Q is sequential if it has coding of finite sequences 
of arbitrary objects- i.e. has a predicate Seq and functions (s) » IMs) 
such that the following is provable in T: there is an empty sequence (of 
length 0), the length of each sequence is a number and for each sequence s of 
a length x and an arbitrary object z there is a sequence s* of length %+\ 
prolonging s by L (See Pudlilk 1853). 
(3) ACAQ is Urn usual (fully) conservative second order extension of 
PA, i.e. ACA has two sorts of variables (cumbers arid sets), axioms of PI 
for numbers with toe induction scheme replaced by a single axiom 
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Oft Xfc(V x ) ( x * X -* x+l%X) and with comprehension for all formulas contain-
ing no set quantifiers. (Note that ACA is sequential; ACA is related to PA 
as GB to ZP.) 
1.6. Theorem (Pudl£k C'853). (1) Let T be a consistent sequential theo-
ry, S a finitely axiomatized theory. S is interpretable in T iff there is a 
definable cut 3 in T such that ThHCon (S), i.e. T proves that 3 does not con-
tain any herbrandian proof of the contradiction from S. 
(2) In particular, if T is consistent, finitely axiomatizable and sequ-
ential then there is a definable cut 3 in T such that ThHCon (T). 
(3) On the contrary, for such a T there is no cut 3 such that 
ThConJ(T). 
Point (2) can be strengthened as follows: 
1.7. Theorem. Let T be finitely axiomatizable, sequential and let 
T h l S . . Then there is a cut 3 in T such that 
Th(Vu)(Tr- (u)-» HCon3((T+u))). 
(Proof by inspection of PudlSk 1853 - tedious.) 
§ 2. Some prominent examples 
2.1. We shall investigate the properties of Gbdel s consistency formula 
ConT and Rosser's formula J»J, for T being either an extension of PA in the 
same language or a finitely axiomatized extension of IS,. (In the former ca-
se we assume a fixed A , Enumeration of the axioms to be given; in the lat-
ter we work with the natural binumeration just listing the axioms.) Both 
formulas may be constructed using either Prf or HPrf; for Con-- this is imma-
terial (see above), but for the Rosser's formula (which we assume in S , 
form, i.e. saying "there is a proof y of my negation such that no z<y is a 
proof of me") there may be differences: some results below hold only for the 
Rosser's formula based on HPrf, say, the H-Rosser formula. 
2.2. Convention: If T is a theory and gp a formula of T we say that $p 
is interpretable in T meaning that the theory (T+ j>) is interpretable in T. 
2.3. Theorem. Let T2I2E, be consistent (and axiomatizable). 
(1) Gbdel s formula Con is not interpretable in T and its negation 
"iCon isinterpretabie in T. 
(2) -|Con is TT. conservative; Con is .3S,-conservative iff T is 3E,-
sound (i.e. each provable 2.,-formula is true in N). 
(3) Rosser's formula f> is TT,-nonconservative; -ip is 2L-conservative 
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iff T is X,-sound. (The same holds for the H-Rosser formula.) 
(4) If T is sequential and has induction for all formulas then neither 
*> nor ~\p is interpretable. (The same for H-Rosser formula.) 
(5) But if T is sequential and finitely axiomatizable and p is the H-
Rosser formula then both rt> and nj& are interpretable. 
Comments on proofs. (1) For the first claim see Feferman [60J and Svej 
dar £783; for the second see Feferman 1.60-1 where TiUPA is assumed. The same 
result can be proved: 
(a) for T2 B S using Low Basis Theorem (see Clote C833) and the corre-
sponding Low Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, 
(b) for T 3 I 2 , finitely axiomatized using Second Gbdel's incomplete-
ness theorem and Pudlal<'s theorem 1.6 and 
(c) in full generality i.e. for any TsTjS", using a version of Low Ba-
sis Theorem in IS., (see Hajek and Kucera tool ). 
(2) The first claim is due to Kreisel t683 and is the first example of 
non-trivial partial conservativity. Checking for Talis, is immediate. The 
second claim is due to Smorynski -.803. 
(3) First claim is due to Kreisel £623, second to Svejdar (unpublished) 
(4) Follows easily from (3) and from 1.1. 
(5) PudlaVs theorem 1.6 gives an interpretation of (T+c* ) in (T+ ip) 
and vice versa. 
Problem: does (5) also hold for the usual (non-herbrandian) Rosser for-
mula? 
2.4. Corollary. If T is sequential and finitely axiomatized then there 
is a T7, .formula y such that both <p and -\<p are interpretable in T.(For 
PA and similar theories there is no such y ,) In particular, if T is ACA 
then (ACA + 9 ) is interpretable in ACA but (PA+9O is not interpretable in 
PA. Similarly for GB and ZF instead of ACA and PA. First example of such a 
*f was constructed by Solovay (unpublished, cf. H^jekt8l3). 
§ 3. General theorems on partial conservativity. We shall present seve-
ral theorems on partial conservativity. Their proofs use various generaliza-
tions of Rosser's formula. In the whole section T a l X , is a fixed consistent 
axiomatized theory (and we assume a A , binumeration of T to be fixed). 
3.1. Notation. (1) Let ot-(u), /J(u) be two T-formulas, let A be 
(3u)c-t»(u) and V be (3u)/2(u). (06, fi may contain parameters.) Following 
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Guaspari we denote by A -417 the formula 
(J u)(<* (<i)£ (Vv*u)~i/S (V)) 
(there is a witness for a* less than each witness forfi ). 
(2) If fi is ft and fi* is the 3E formula naturally equivalent to ~i/3 
then A-<*1? will denote the formula 
(3u)(*(u)*I(tfv*u) fifMJ***'*) 
(assuming that n is clear from the context). Similarly, Aifi ? is 
(3 u)(«* (u) M ( Vv«u) £* (v)]***'*) . 
3.2. ftanark. We shall investigate self referential formulas satisfying 
T#-f a&(nf )-<*y(f ) 
or, more generally, for each k, 
T ̂  f (k)« A (i f *)-<*S7(f ,!<)-
Observe that if «c is 3E and £ is TT^ then £ is 3E in T. 
(2) If A t is taiOaC^u) and V% is (av)jj.(v) (i=l,2) then 
(&. v A ^ ^ ^ i v V - ) means t.he formula saying "there is a witness for 
aClvtfC2 ^ess **WI ea£*1 witness for /!-, v/^"* similarly for-<* instead of-4-
3.3. definition. (1) <f is hereditarily P-conservative over T if, for 
each F such that I2tfi T S T, % is P-conservative over T . -
o 1 o ' # o 
(2) y is doubly P-conservative over T i f y is P-conservative over T 
and -igp is P-conservative over T (where P is the dual class of P ) . 
He shal l now fomulate three general theorems on par t ia l conservativity. 
3.4. TheoreB. For each nSl there is (1) a hered i tar i ly TT^conserva-
t i ve 3En-sentence, (2 ) a hered i tar i ly 3E -conservative TT -sentence, (3) a 
'dodbly TTn-conservative Xn-sentence ( i t s negation is thus a doubly ^ c o n -
servative TT -sentence). 
Examples ( P is .Sn, A is TTn): 
(1) f such that I l j h f • P r ^ f " ) - < * P r ( p , 
(2) ( i f ) such that I X X I - | i- Pr ( - i J ) < * P r A ( f ) , 
(3) { such that H E , * § Sk ?^{-%J > * * P r A ( f ) -
I f T is 2 n -sound we way take i n ( l ) a £ such that I ^ f r - J a P r ^ i J )-
3.5. Thoore« (on non-separability). Let P be X n or TT^ ( n Z l ) , Th be 
the set of a l l theorems of T, Consv(P) and hConsv(P) the set of a l l P-con -
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servative and hereditarily F-conservative sentences respectively , NRef the 
set of a l l the sentences non-refutable in T. Then obviously 
Th£hCortsvC P ) £ ConsvC F)&ConsvC3E1)^ConsvCTT1)£ Nref 
and there is no set X such that 
CI) X i s i ! ^ and ThSX^NRef Cciassical.), 
C2) X i s "ifj and ThSXS ConsvC P ) , 
C3) X i s SEj and hConsvCP)SXS NRef, 
(4) X i s 2£2, P 2. X and r€onsv( P) f i XSConsvC^), 
(4*) X isl£ 2, P SFTI-r and hConsvC P)SX&Consv(Tî1). 
3.6. 1herare» (Tl2-cQinpIeteness). For each niTI and F*Jg or 7T both 
ConsvC P ) and hConsvCP) is TL-coBplete. 
3."", Remark. Theorem 3.4 was obtained for T2rPA by Guaspari and Solo-
vay, sec Guaspari 1671; their examples are more complicated than ours. 
Theoreiii 3.5: 
(1) is very classical, (2) seems to be new. (3) was first proved in the parti* 
cular case T=2F, P = TF.,. interpretability instead of partial conservativity 
in Myek 171]; Littdstrom £843 generaliz for T=»PA, the present generalizati 
on is mine. C4) is contained (implicitly) in Lindstrdur 1841 for T2 PA. 
Theorem 3.6: 
For T=ZF and P =• IF, Cand interpretability) Solovay; his proof works for PA. 
For PA, P = ¥1^ and Cons see Hajek 1793, for PA, P = S n and Consv see Ouin-
sey l»ll. In full generality but for TSPA see Lindstrdw £843; generalization 
to T3IS-. is mine. 
Jfe shall present two general fixed point theorems that fan* the main me-
ans of proofs of the preceding theorems. 
3.8. &m*atiBM*~&mwyrKkx'& fixed point theorem.. Let } , f be 2E 
formulas. 
CI) Let I I ^ j s CCPrC-ff ) v f ) -CCPr (p v
1 f ) J - Then 
Ci) T§~| i f f N ** i < Y i f f M=*|5 
Cii) T | - T | i f f H j ^ l f . * § . 
(2) More generally, let, for i=i,2, T^IST^, let Pr4 be the proof pre-
dicate based on a fixed i3L bimimeration of j . m Let 
I X i J - | g F r C P r 1 ( n | ) v P r 2 C n | ) v f ) < ( P r | C | K*Pr2C| )vT>X Then 
Ci) TXIK| i f f T2 l -£ i f f K l » 4 i < ^ i f f H ** | ; 
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( i i ) T 1 h l f i f f T 2 h - | £ i f f N i » Y - * $ -
For proofs see Shepherdson t60 l , Smorynski £80]. 
3.9. Lirjdstrom's fixed point theorem. (Let T be as above.) 
(1) Let xW be S and let 
iS .H f s Pr.- ( i ? ) < * ( 3 y h x ( y ) . Then 
( i ) for each m, (T+£ ) r- % (m), 
( i i ) for each I S . S T ST and each TT -sentence IK , (T +£) i-of implies 
T0+<x(m)|mlhar . 
(2) Let ^ ( y ) be TTn and let 
i r - ^ f ar ( 3y ) - i ^ ( y ) ^ *P r T T (P ). Then 
n 
(i) for each m, (T+iP ) h ^(m), 
( i i ) for each I ^ . f i T ST and each S -sentence 6* , (T + - I P ) H €T implies 
T0+-C^(m)|m^ t - t f . 
For T2PA see Lindstrom C843. 
3.10. Remark. Both fixed point theorems may be parametrized (by repla-
cing | ,$,¥*, %(y) by |(k), $(k), Y(k), $(y,E) respectively); details 
are evident. Shepherdson-Smorynski theorem is used to prove 3.5 (1),(2) (and 
is very useful at many other occasions); Lindstrom s theorem is used f o r the 
rest of 3.5 and for 3.4. The proof of 3.6 uses Lindstrom s theorem and the 
following consequence of Shepherdson-Smorynski theorem: if X is a 2T, set and 
I2S,S.T £ L then there is a X , formula 6(x) and TT. formula tfr(x) such 
that both 6 and ft numerate X both in T and in T,. 
o 1 
§ 4. Applications to in t e rp re tab i l i t y . It follows from 1.1 and 3.6 that 
if T is consistent sequential and has full induction then the set of all §* 
interpretable in T (i.e. such that the theory (T+$p) is interpretable in T) 
is a complete "FT* set. We focus our attention to finitely axiomatized theo-
ries containing 12-. Note that if. T is finitely axiomatizable then the set 
IntpT of all Of interpretable in T is j£y 
4.1v Theorea. Let T be finitely axiomatized, T2I.2?, and let P * S or 
P = TT (n21). Then Consv(D-Int p T is non-empty and contains a r-senten-
4.2. Re«ark. In particular, let T be ACA and J^TT,. We get a S,-for-
mula 9 which is TT,-conservative over ACA but (ACA +<p) is not interpret-
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able in ACA . Since <p is TT,-conservative over ACA^ it is TT, -conservative o T 1 o 1 
over PA and thus (PA+9) is interpretable in PA. Compare this with 2.4: we 
had there a TT formula such that (ACA + 9 ) is interpretable in ACA but 
(PA+9) is not in PA. Similarly for GB and ZF. 
The first example of a 2 L formula 9 such that ZF+9 is interpretable 
in ZF but (GB+ 9 ) is not in GB was constructed in Hgjek £.713 under the as-
sumption of o>-consistency; this assumption was removed in Hajek and Hajkov£ 
[723. A 2£, formula of the desired properties was first constructed by Solo-
vay. 
4.3. We shall investigate the situation more closely. In the sequel let 
T be a finitely axiomatized consistent theory containing 1 2 , . We focus our 
attention to independent 2E, sentences. First .observe that each independent 
(nonprovable and nonrefutable) 2 , sentence is false and trivially it is 
HE ,-nonconservative. For each such 2f, sentence 5 we may ask 
- whether €» is TT,-conservative, 
- whether 6 is interpretable, 
- whether iff is interpretable. 
The formula ~i€f is TT, and hence TT,-nonconservative; if T is 2,-sound then 
-\G is Si-conservative. For 2,-ill theories the 2,-conservativity of -%€ 
is a reasonable question but we shall not discuss it. 
Our three questions admit eight combinations of answers, say, eight ty-
pes of independent IE, formulas. 
4.4. Theorem. For each type, there is an independent 2L, formula of 
that type. 
4.5. We shall describe examples in a rather uniform way. We shall use 
formulas HPr and HPr_ , i.e. he rbrandian provability and herbrandian provabi-
lity from a true X , sentence. Further we shall use a X * formula Intp(x) 
formally expressing (i.e. numerating-in-12,) interpretability of a formula 
in T. All examples have the form of a self-referential formula £ such that 
Î i !~f m A ("if )<*V(p 
where A(x) has one of the following forms: 
HPr(x), HPIL. (x), HPr(x)vIntp(x), HPr—(x)vlntp(x). 
2 1 n 
v*(x) has one of the following forms: 
HPr(x), HPr(x)vIntp(x). 
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This gives eight possibilites tbaf exactly give our eight examples. For 
several claims it is immaterial whether we use Pr or Hpr; but for some claims 
(using 1.7) it is not. 
4.6. ntBDm. (1) All eight examples are independent X , sentences. 
(2) £ is interpretable iff V does not contain Intp(x). 
(3) *n| is interpretable iff £k does not contain Intp(x). 
(4) £ is Tt.-conservative iff A contains *Fr— (x). 
"N* Proof uses 1.6, 1.7, provability of Herbrand's theorem in I2L and 
the following very important theorem (more precisely, its corollary 4.8): 
4.7. Second LirwistrbVs fixed point theorea. Let T-^ISEj, n,m2r0, P = 
= X n , A ^ T ? ^ . Let ̂ p(x,y) be a r-formula, d(x,y) a A-formula. 
Let 
T I - | * t ( P r r ( V p v ( a y ) ? ( n f ,y))^(PrA(|)v(.3u)9(f ,u))l. 
Then 
(1) for eachm, (T+£) t~ (3y*m)e(|T,y) -* (3y^n)y(-if ,y), 
(2) for each m, ( T + i p H ( J y ^ D ^ H f ,y)-> (3y.4ln)0(f ,y), 
(3) each P-sentence provable in (T+£) is provable in T+{-i0(£ ,m)|m}, 
(4) each r-sentence provable in (T+-if ) is provable in T+-H9(J ,m)|m}. 
(5) The above remains true if Pr is replaced by HPr in all occurences. 
4.8. Corollary. If (3y)0(x,y) defines a set XSNRef (of non-refutable 
sentences) and (3y)^(x,y) defines a set Y of non-refutable sentences then £ 
satisfies the following: 
£ is TTn-conservative, *t| is X -conservative, £ 4
 x» (~i£ ) 4 Y* 
4.9. Remark. Note that Lindstrom has 4.7 and 4.8 for T^PA. The genera-
lization of constructions of partially conservative sentences presented up to 
now (from T2PA to T2l.Su) could make the reader think that everything gene-
ralizes smoothly. It is indeed remarkable that in most constructions the re-
placement of 4 by -«4 works. But there are some things that do not genera-
lize: for example, the implication 
(AvV)-»((A<<V)v(?4A) 
(provable in PA) does not immediately generalize to I2L using •> . Another 
example is in Lindstrom £79J: If T=PA and X&NRef then there is a A^ binume-
ration f of PA such that (PA+nCorO is interpretable in PA but 
(ACA +TCOTLJ is not interpretable in ACA . It is not clear how to generalize 
this from ACAQ to any finitely axiomatizable T3I2L. 
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Lindstrom's papers contain (for T2PA) various stronger and more detail-
ed theorems on partial conservativity. It has been our task to demonstrate 
the possibility and ways of generalization to T2I2T-. on the most important 
theorems rather than to cover everything. 
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